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PAVING THE ROAD TO WETlANDS 
MITIGATION BANKING 
JENNIFER NEAL * 
Supporters of the relatively new concept of wetlands mitigation 
banking herald it as environmentally superior to on-site mitigation 
undertaken at individual project sites because mitigation banks can 
be used collectively for the restoration, enhancement, or creation of 
larger, more viable wetlands. Still, many environmental groups re-
main apprehensive. This Comment examines the emergence of wet-
lands mitigation banking as a means to satisfy the Clean Water Act 
§ 404(b) sequencing requirement of compensation. This Comment 
argues that explicit legislative support, such as that contained in the 
recent Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), is 
essential to provide the necessary market support of mitigation bank-
ing. In addition, a comprehensive federal statute would promote the 
establishment of an economically and environmentally successful 
mitigation banking system. 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of America's shopping malls, highways, and 
housing developments has contributed to the destruction of over half 
of the original 230 million acres of wetlands that the first settlers of 
the United States found upon arrival,l Wetlands protection has long 
* Executive Editor, 1999-2000, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw RE-
VIEW. 
I See Michael Lenetsky, Comment, President Clinton and Wetlands Regulation: Boon or 
Bane to the Environment? 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH.]. 81, 81 n.l (1994) (citing Wetlands: 
Will Clinton Be Bush?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, § 1, at 18). This approximate figme ap-
plies only to the wetlands originally found in the continental United States; the lack of a 
uniform method of wetlands delineation conu'ibutes to the inconsistent figures for the 
exact amount of wetlands. See id. According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, when 
European settlers first alTived, total wetlands acreage was more than 220 million acres in 
the lower 48 states, or about 5% of total land area. See Jeffrey A. Zinn & Claudia Copeland, 
97014: Wetlands Issues in the 105th Congress (last modified Sept. 14, 1998) <http:/ / 
www.cnie.org/nle/wet-5.html>[hereinafterWetlandsIssues].ByI980. total wetlands aCl'e-
age was estimated at lO4 million acres. See id. Losses continue, although the rate of loss has 
slowed considerably during the past decade. See id. Recent losses have been concentrated 
in the lower Mississippi River Valley, the upper Midwest, and the Southeast. See id. The 
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been among the most controversial of national environmental poli-
cies, in part because it is implemented through an inconsistent2 and 
often ineffective3 federal regulatory program. Despite the goal of "no 
net 10ss,"4 wetlands in the United States continue to be destroyed and 
disrupted at an alarming rate.5 
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA) § 404(b) sequencing process, 
developers of projects that impact wetlands must: 
1. demonstrate that the least environmentally-damaging alter-
native will be used; 
2. minimize any unavoidable impacts; and 
3. compensate for or offset the harm.6 
Compensation is achieved through the process of restoration, crea-
tion, enhancement, or preservation of wetlands, collectively termed 
mitigation.7 On-site mitigation is generally the preferred alternative to 
compensate for unavoidable damage to wetlands.8 This rigid system 
generally results in the creation of fragmented, isolated, and poorly 
monitored wetlands with limited ecological value.9 
Clinton Administration policies embodied five principles: 1) supporting no overall net loss 
of the Nation's remaining wetlands together with increasing the quality and quantity of 
wetlands as a long-term goal; 2) making regulatory programs fail; flexible, and predictable; 
3) encouraging options to regulatory progl'ams; 4) expanding partnerships to protect and 
restore wetlands in an ecosystem/watershed context; and 5) basing wetlands policies on 
the best scientific data available. See id. 
2 See Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in Wetlands Protection, 9 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 203-04 (1994). 
3 See Jonathan Silverstein, Comment, Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetlands 
Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands Protection, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFT. L. 
REv. 129, 129 (1994). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 18-24. 
5 See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133; Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to 
Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REv. 358, 358 (1988). "No net loss" of wetlands is a 
wetlands resource conservation and management principle, under which, over the long 
term, loss of wetlands area or functional capacity is offset by gains in wetlands area or func-
tional capacity due to wetlands restoration, enhancement, preservation, or creation. U.S. 
Department of Transportation Proposed Rules for Mitigating Wetlands Losses to Private 
Lands, 23 C.F.R. § 777.2 (1999). 
6 See Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); CWA Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 230 (1998). 
7 See Virginia C. Veltman, Comment, Banking on the Future of Wetlands Using Federal Law, 
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 654, 657 (1995). 
8 See id. at 658. 
9 See, e.g., Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133. 
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Wetlands mitigation banking, a subset of compensatory mitiga-
tion,IO represents an innovative, market-based resolution to many of 
the current problems associated with on-site wetlands mitigation. ll 
Upon establishing a mitigation "bank" by enhancing, restoring, or 
creating wetlands habitats, the creator of a mitigation bank (the 
"banker") can satisfY CWA requirements by selling wetlands "credits" 
to deveiopers.I2 Mitigation banking provides greater certainty in the 
development permitting process, creating more ecologically 
significant and successful wetlands mitigation projects, and develop-
ing a new industry devoted to the restoration and creation of wet-
lands.13 
On August 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration released a com-
prehensive package of improvements to Federal wetlands programs 
that included support for the use of mitigation banks.I4 The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engi-
neers (the "Corps") simultaneously released interim guidance clarifY-
ing the role of mitigation banks in the CWA § 404 permitting 
program.I5 This guidance has subsequently been expanded to include 
guidelines for the establishment and use of mitigation banks.l6 Par-
ticipation in the mitigation banking program has been slow, however, 
partially due to a lack of regulatory support.I7 
On June 9, 1998, the President signed into law Pub. L. No. 105-
178: the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21).I8 
TEA-21 authorizes programs for highway, highway safety, transit, and 
other surface transportation for the next six years.l9 A brief yet 
significant passage in TEA-21 endorses using wetlands banks for miti-
10 See William W. Sapp, Mitigation Banking: Panacea or Poison for Wetlands Protection, 1 
ENVTL. L. 99,103,108 (1994); Silverstein, supra note 3, at 145-46. 
11 See La""Tence R. Liebesman & David M. Plott, The Emergence of Private Wetlands Mitiga-
tion Banking, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 341,371 (1998). 
12 SeeSapp, supra note 10, at 108. 
13 See, e.g., Liebesman & Plott, supra note ll, at 371 (1998). 
14 See Protecting America s Wetlands: A Fail; Flexible, and Effective Approach, WHITE HOUSE 
OFF. ON ENVTL. POL'y (Aug. 24, 1993). 
15 See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Department of the Army Concenling the Determination of Mitigation Under the 
Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(l) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210, 92ll-13 (Mar. 12, 1990) 
[hereinafter MOA]. 
16 See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation 
Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58605, 58609-14. (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Federal Guidance]. 
17 See, e.g., Liebesman & Plott, supra note 11, at 341; Veltman, supra note 7, at 683. 
18 See Ti'ansportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, 23 U.S.CA § 103 (1998) [here-
inafter TEA-21]. 
19 See id.; Forecast '99, ENGINEERING NEWS-REc.,jan. 25, 1999, at 49, 50. 
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gation of some transportation projects, placing TEA-21 among the 
first substantial legislative acts to specity a preference for mitigation 
banking where compensatory mitigation is required.20 This passage 
indicates growing support of the mitigation concept in the regulatory 
system, and provides the much needed commitment to this struggling 
new alternative to America's wetlands policy problem.21 
This Comment explores wetlands mitigation banking in light of 
the recent passage of TEA-21. Section I provides a history of wetlands 
regulation in the United States under the Clean Water Act. Section II 
details the failure of traditional compensatory mitigation under the 
Clean Water Act. Section III discusses wetlands mitigation as a poten-
tial solution to many of the problems considered in Section II. Section 
IV introduces and briefly discusses the Transportation Equity Act for 
the 21st Century. Finally, Section V examines the significance of TEA-
21 for wetlands mitigation and identifies areas of focus for implemen-
tation of the Act. Section V also examines the need for a comprehen-
sive federal statute to support, clarity, and set consistent standards for 
mitigation banking. 
I. THE HISTORY OF WETLANDS REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
The desire to protect our nation's wetlands is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.22 Filling wetlands was once encouraged, since it took 
apparent wastelands and made them productive.23 
Over the past two decades, this view on wetlands protection has 
reversed.24 It is now recognized that wetlands serve a variety of impor-
tant functions, providing ecological, economic, and aesthetic value.25 
20 See Don Merwin & Kathleen Lundy Springuel, 1EA 21 Brews a Mix of Money and Bal-
ance, ENGINEERING NEWS-REc., Oct. 19, 1998, at E-3. 
21 See generally Michael G. LeDesma, Note, A Sound of Thunder: Problems and Prospects in 
Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 497, 497 (1994); Veltman, supra note 7, 
at 683 (indicating the need for clear regulatory support of wetlands mitigation banking). 
22 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 131-32. 
23 See id. at 13l. Many of America's urban areas and farmlands were once wetlands. See 
id. The first legislation on wetlands, the Swamp Lands Acts of 1849, 1850, and 1860, con-
veyed to 16 states all swamp and flood lands so the states could convert these lands to agri-
cultural use. See Hearing on Federal Wetlands Regulations: Hearing Before the Comm. on Small 
Business, 102d Congo 54 (1991) (statement of Elizabeth Raisbeck, Senior Vice PI"esident, 
National Audubon Society). 
24 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 132. 
25 See, e.g., LeDesma, supra note 21, at 497-98; Velunan, supra note 7, at 655. Wetlands 
are now recognized as important for: the conveyance and storage of floodwater; the pre-
vention of erosion and saltwater intrusion; sediment conu"ol; habitats for fish, shellfish, 
waterfowl, and other wildlife; habitats for endangered species; recreation; water supply and 
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Unfortunately, wetlands remain a desirable site for commercial, resi-
dential, and agricultural development because many of their charac-
teristics, including rich soil, proximity to water, flat topography, and 
the existence of commercially valuable species, render them ideal for 
development.26 Consequently, wetlands regulation is increasingly be-
ing perceived as essential to protecting the functional value of wet-
lands.27 
Federal regulations protect wetlands not by completely prohibit-
ing their development, but by requiring permits when they are devel-
oped.28 For example, the principle federal regulatory protection for 
wetlands is § 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) .29 Established in 
1972, the CWA is intended to protect water and adjacent land from 
adverse environmental effects due to discharges of dredged or fill ma-
terial.30 Section 404 requires landowners and developers to obtain 
permits to carry out activities that involve disposal of dredged or fill 
materials into waters of the United States,31 including wetlands.32 
water quality mailltenance; food production; timber production; archeological I'esearch; 
educational and reSeaI-dl value; and open space and aesthetic value. See LeDesma, supra 
note 21, at 497-98. Nearly 35% of all rare and endangered species live in or rely upon 
wetlands. See Veltman, supra note 7, at 654. 
26 See, e.g., LeDesma, supra note 21, at 498; Veltman, supra note 7, at 655. In 1991, the 
Boston Globe reported that if the United States loses just its "drier-end" wetlands (not com-
monly associated with designations like swamps or bogs), the public would incur costs of 
up to $75 billion for advanced waste water treatment to offset the impact from the loss of 
filtering functions provided by these wetlands. See Diane Dumanoski, Heavy Toll Seen If 
"Drier" Wetlands Are Developed, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1991, at 1. 
27 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 656. 
28 See id. Early laws tended to focus on waterfowl nesting and breeding (e.g., the Wet-
lands Loan Act of 1961, amendments to the Migratory Bird Stamp Act of 1934, and the 
Water Bank Act of 1970). See id. Congress has since recognized the broader importance of 
wetlands, and has attempted to enact more thorough legislation. See id. For example, the 
Coastal BaITiel's Resources Act of 1982 denies federal funding for development of certain 
coastal barriers, many of which are wetlands; the Swampbuster Provision of tile Food Secu-
rity Act of 1985 prohibits government subsidies to fanners who grow crops on drained 
wetlands; and the Clean Water Act requires a permit for dredging and filling wetlands. See 
id. 
29 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); CWA GUIDELINES, 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1998). 
30 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The CWA defines "pollutants" broadly, including dl'edged 
spoil and fill material, material used to increase a wetlands' surface elevation. See id. 
31 See CLEAN WATER ACT, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The COIPS has had jurisdiction over dredg-
ing and filling since the River and Harbor Act of 1899. See Veltman, supra note 7, at 661. 
32 See Peter A. Buchsbaum, Federal Regulation of Land Use: Uncle Sam the Permit IWan, 25 
URB. LAw. 589,593-94 (1993); Lawrence R. Liebesman & Philip T. Hundemann, Regula-
tory Standards for Permits Under the Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit Program, in THE NATU-
RAL RESOURCES LAw MANUAL 3, 3 (Richard J. Fink ed., 1995) (interpreting CWA to in-
clude adjacent wetlands). 
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Recently, both the Bush and Clinton administrations made the 
protection of wetlands a priority.33 President Bush's wetlands policy 
made the goal of "no net loss" a national objective.34 "No net loss" was 
originally announced in 1988 as the goal of The Conservation Foun-
dation,35 and was a pivotal platform of the 1987 National Wetlands 
Policy Forum, convened at EPA's request to assess wetlands policy is-
sues and recommend improvements.36 Under this wetlands resource 
and conservation management principle, the national net amount of 
wetlands should not be allowed to decrease.37 Ultimately, any loss of 
wetlands area or functional capacity must be off-set by gains in wet-
lands area or functional capacity by means of wetlands restoration, 
creation, enhancement, or preservation.38 Recognizing the inevitabil-
ity of wetlands loss, this goal mandates increased efforts to restore, 
create, enhance, or preserve wetlands (collectively called mitigation) 
to balance net losses with net gains.39 Thus, mitigation policy and sci-
ence have played an important role in wetlands policy since the late 
1980s.4O 
On August 24, 1993, the Clinton Administration announced its 
wetlands policy, entitled "Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair, 
Flexible, and Effective Approach. "41 The Clinton policy perpetuates 
the national goal of "no net loss" ofwetlands.42 This policy proposed: 
1. using the best available science to define and delineate wet-
lands; 
2. improving the current regulatory program and encouraging 
non-regulatory options; and 
3. expanding the partnerships in wetlands protection efforts.43 
33 See Wetlands Issues, supra note 1. 
34 See, e.g., LeDesma, supra note 21, at 499. The Bush administration failed to achieve 
this goal because complicated issues surrounding wetland delineation delayed wetland 
protection. See id. 
35 See id. 
36 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 657. 
37 See U.S. Dep't of Transp. Proposed Rules for Mitigating Wetland Losses to Private 
Lands, 23 C.F.R. § 777.2 (1999). 
38 See id. 
39 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 657. 
40 See id. 
41 See Protecting America:S Wetlands: A Fair, Flexible, and Effective Approach, WHITE HOUSE 
OFF. ON ENVTL. POL'y (Aug. 24, 1993). 
42 See, e.g., LeDesma, supra note 21, at 499. 
43 See Wetlands Issues, supra note 1; see also 58 Fed. Reg. 47,719-21 (1994) (referring to 
U.S. Army COlPS of Engineers guidance letter implementing the President's policy initia-
tive). 
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Integral to this policy is the CWA § 404(b) sequencing process. 
A. CWA Section 404 "Sequencing" 
Under its CWA authority,44 EPA developed guidelines to evaluate 
permit applications, codified in § 404(b)(I).45 The § 404 guidelines 
establish a three-step approach, commonly called "sequencing," to 
determine how a project impacting wetlands will proceed.46 The first 
step reviews alternatives and requires that the party demonstrate that 
he or she will use the least environmentally-damaging alternative.47 
The "practical alternatives" test stringently requires consideration of 
areas not presently owned by the applicant, but which could be rea-
sonably obtained, utilized, or expanded for the same activity.48 There 
is a presumption in favor of any alternative not involving wetlands, 
unless it is clearly demonstrated that the alternative would have a 
greater adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem than the proposed 
development.49 
If harm to wetlands cannot be avoided, the second step requires 
that the party seeking the permit formulate a plan to minimize this 
harm.50 Finally, when harm to wetlands functions cannot be avoided 
and will occur despite minimization, the third step requires that the 
party compensate for, or offset the harm.51 This final step, known as 
compensatory mitigation, is accomplished in coordination with the 
44 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1) (1994). 
45 SeeCWA Guideline, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10-.12 (1994). 
46 See id. § 230.10(a), (d) (1994) (prohibiting discharge of dredged or fill material if 
there is a practicable alternative with a "less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem" and 
prohibiting discharge of dredged or fill material unless adverse impacts are minimized). 
The CWA Guidelines were subsequently clarified by the Mitigation Memorandum of 
Agreement. See MOA, supra note 15. 
47 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1O(a); MOA, supra note 15. The CWA Guidelines specify that 
regulatory agencies shall pl'esume that alternatives are available if the project is not water 
dependent. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (3); MOA, supra note 15, at 9212. 
48 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2). 
49 Seeid. § 230.10(a) (3). 
50 See id. § 230.10(d). The CWA Guidelines state that no permit shall be issued unless 
the applicant has taken all "appropriate and practicable steps" to "minimize potential ad-
verse impacts of the discharge." See id. For example, a developer might schedule construc-
tion so as not to disl'upt the site during the period when migratory birds nest in the area. 
51 See CWA Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.75(d); MOA, supra note 15. at 9212. Although 
the CWA Guidelines include compensatory mitigation as part of minimization, the subse-
quent MOA distinguishes the two as individual steps in the sequencing process. See 40 
C.F.R. § 230.75(d); MOA, supra note 15, at 9212. 
168 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:161 
Corps, yielding a plan to restore, enhance, create, or preserve other 
wetlands located on- or off-site.52 
B. CWA Administration 
While Congress delegated most of the authority to administer the 
CWA to EPA,53 the Corps successfully argued that it should have the 
primary authority to administer permits because of its experience 
managing similar activities, such as the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act and dredging.54 Accordingly, Congress authorized the Corps 
to grant or deny § 404 permit applications, subject to EPA's veto.55 
The § 404(b) guidelines, promulgated by EPA "in conjunction 
with" the Corps in 1980, provide the chief environmental criteria gov-
erning the issuance of § 404 permits.56 The Corps, however, did not 
concede that these guidelines imposed binding requirements until 
1984, as a consequence of a lawsuit settlement arising out of National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh.57 Even after this case, and throughout the 
1980s, EPA and the Corps frequently disagreed over how to interpret 
these guidelines, resulting in an inconsistent regulatory program.58 
Until 1990, there was no comprehensive federal policy regarding 
enforcement under the CWA.59 EPA, the Corps, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS), and the Soil Conservation Service of the Department 
of Agriculture each regulate the discharge of pollutants into wetlands 
under the CWA.60 Consequently, the administering of § 404 was highly 
irregular as each agency adopted its own system of policies, guide-
lines, and practices, often in conflict with another agency's system.61 
For example, while EPA continued to employ sequencing, some Corps 
districts followed a "buy-dowu" approach that conflicted with strict 
sequencing.62 
52 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.75(d); MOA, supra note 15, at 9212. 
53 SeeC1ean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1); CWA Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230. 
54 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 661. 
55 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b), (c). EPA accords great discretion to the Corps' decisions re-
garding permit applications; as of 1995, EPA had exercised its veto power only 11 times 
since the inception of the CWA. See Veltman, supra note 7, at 661 n.68. 
56 See 40 C.F.R. § 230; see also text at notes 43-44. 
57 See National Wildlife Fed. v. Marsh, 14 ENVTL. L. REp. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,262,20,264 
(D.D.C.1984). 
58 See Blumm, supra note 2, at 222. 
59 See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Tak-
ings, IOWA L. REv. 527, 564 (1996); see also supra text accompanying notes 27-29. 
60 See Lenetsky, supra note 1, at 84. 
61 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 27-29. 
62 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 536. 
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Under the buy-down approach, applicants avoid strict sequencing 
by offering a compensatory mitigation package with their initial per-
mit application.63 By promising to restore or enhance more wetlands 
than would be destroyed during the proposed project, the Corps 
could comply with the "no net loss" policy without requiring the ap-
plicant to first avoid, then minimize, any wetlands destruction at the 
project 10cation.64 Although theoretically plausible, this approach, in 
practice, sometimes led to wetlands 10ss.65 Further, this approach also 
led to the restoration, creation, or enhancement of many isolated wet-
lands at project sites by developers who lacked the scientific knowl-
edge or market incentive to ensure that these wetlands succeeded.66 
In 1990, EPA and the Corps signed a Memorandum of Agree-
ment (MOA) to resolve this controversy.67 The MOA established se-
quencing as the preferred wetlands protection process and implicitly 
precluded the buy-down approach.68 Thus, applicants were put on 
notice that sequencing would be interpreted to require that they first 
avoid, then minimize, and finally, compensate any harm done to wet-
lands functions and values.69 
Significant to the mitigation banking issue, the MOA provides 
that when wetland damage cannot be avoided and compensatory 
mitigation is required, on-site mitigation (adjacent to the affected wet-
land) is preferred to off-site mitigation and in-kind mitigation (of a 
type similar to the affected wetland) is preferred to out-of-kind miti-
gation.7o Further, the MOA approved mitigation banking as an ac-
ceptable option for compensatory mitigation, and expressed a prefer-
ence for restoration and enhancement over creation or preservation 
of wetlands for compensatory mitigation.71 
The 1990 MOA provides two exceptions to sequencing.72 The 
first is a de minimus exception, used when "EPA and the Corps agree 
that the proposed discharge can reasonably be expected to result in 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See, e.g., id. at 537; Robert D. Sokolove & Robert Thompson, The Future of Wetlands 
Ref5Ulation is Here, 23 REAL EST. LJ. 78, 84-85 (1994). 
66 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 59, at 537; Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 84. 
67 See MOA, supra note 15. 
68 See id. at 9211. 
69 See id. at 9211-12. 
70 See id. at 9212. 
71 See id. 
72 See MOA, supra note 15, at 9213 & n.7; Veltman supra note 7, at 670. 
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... insignificant environmentallosses."73 This exception is said to al-
low "the type of small, de minimis actions that have gobbled up coasts 
and inland waterways, quarter-acre by quarter-acre, bulkhead by 
bulkhead."74 
The second exception is a de maximis exception, allowing diver-
gence from sequencing in areas where "there is a high proportion of 
land which is wetlands," making it hard to avoid or minimize wetlands 
10ss.75 
Both exceptions expose a great deal of natural wetlands to devel-
opment which is not restricted by the CWA permitting process, in-
creasing the number of wetlands that must be mitigated through 
compensation.76 
Mter approving mitigation banking in the 1990 MOA, EPA and 
the Corps promised additional guidance on the establishment and 
use of mitigation banks.77 They did not issue interim guidance, how-
ever, until 1993.78 Finally, in 1995, this interim guidance was replaced 
when federal guidelines were issued for the establishment and use of 
mitigation banks.79 
C. Relaxing the Sequencing Process 
Because of the CWA § 404(b) requirements and the MOA, the 
public had a low opinion of wetlands regulation in the early 1990s.8o 
Developers and landowners in particular complained that sequencing 
reinforcement unduly burdened their private property rights.81 EPA 
and the Corps responded by attempting to relax their interpretation 
of sequencing requirements on three occasions.82 
73 MOA, supra note 15, at 9212. 
74 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 671 (quoting Oliver A. Houck, More Net Loss of Wetlands: 
The Army-EPA Memorandum of Agreement on Mitigation Under the § 404 Program, 20 ENVTL. L. 
REp. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 10,212, 10,215 (June 1990». 
75 See AIOA, supra note 15, at 9215 n.7. This exception would apply to areas such as 
Alaska, where 45% of the state, Ol' 174,000,000 acres, are wetlands; this comprises nearly 
two thirds of the nation's remaining wetlands. Biumlll, supra note 2, at 210. 
76 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 671. 
77 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 564. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 537-38. 
81 See id.; see also Timothy D. Searchingel; Wetlands Issues 1993: Challenges and a New Ap-
proach, 4 MD.]. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 13,36-37 (1993); Keith Schneider, Landowners 
Unite in Battk Against Regulators, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 9,1995, at AI. 
82 See Issuance of Nationwide Permits fO!' Single-Family Housing, 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 
(Jul. 27, 1995); U.S. EPA and U.S. Dep't of the Army, MemOl'andum to the Field: Appro-
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First, in August 1993, the two agencies released a Memorandum 
to the Field relating to the mitigation requirements under the CWA 
for projects with only minor environmental impacts.83 The Memoran-
dum allows field personnel to consider the level of the proposed proj-
ect's impacts on wetlands in determining the avoidance component of 
sequencing, stating that the "flexibility" of the CWA regulations en-
ables the agencies to "adjust the stringency of the alternatives review 
for projects that would have only minor impacts. "84 Thus, the neces-
sity of finding and evaluating less environmentally-damaging alterna-
tive sites for a project depends upon the function and value of the 
harm to wetlands caused by the project.85 
Second, in March 1995, EPA and the Corps further loosened 
their interpretation of the sequencing process requirements, issuing 
another Memorandum to the Field which provided small landowners 
with more flexibility in searching for less damaging alternative sites.86 
Applicants proposing small projects no longer need to satisfy the first 
step of sequencing by demonstrating that no less environmentally-
damaging alternatives exist, although the requirements for minimiza-
tion and compensation remain.87 
Third, the Corps authorized a Nationwide Permit (NWP) for single-
family residential development later that same year.88 The NWP allows 
the destruction of up to half an acre of non-tidal wetlands during the 
construction or expansion of a single-family home.89 Under the NWP 
system, an applicant need not demonstrate that the proposed site is 
the least damaging alternative.90 The requirements of avoidance and 
minimization of on-site impacts, although not eliminated, may be 
waived if the Corps approves the applicant's "compensatory mitiga-
tion plan. ''91 
priate Level of Analysis Required for Evaluating Compliance with the Section 404(b) (1) 
Guidelines Alternatives Requirements (Aug. 23, 1993) 1-ejJrinted in 60 Fed. Reg. 13,709-11 
(Mar. 14. 1995) [hereinafter Minimum Impacts Memorandum]; Gardner, supra note 59, at 
538-39 (describing U.S. EPA & U.S. Department of the Army, Memorandum for the Field 
(Individual Permit Flexibility for Small Landowners) (March 6, 1995». 
83 See generally Minimum Impacts Memorandum, supra note 82. 
84 See id. at 13,710. 
85 See id. 
86 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 538. 
87 See id. at 539. 
88 See generally Buchsbaum, supra note 2. at 596-97; 60 Fed. Reg. 38,650 (Jul. 27, 1995). 
89 See 60 Fed. Reg. 38,662. 
90 See id. at 38,663; Gardner, supra note 59, at 539. 
91 See 60 Fed. Reg. 38,663 (stating that discharges "must be minimized or avoided to 
the maximum extent practicable at the project site, unless the D[istrict] E[ngineer] has 
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D. EPA Mitigation Banking Guidelines 
The 1995 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Op-
eration of Mitigation Banks (hereinafter "Federal Guidance") ad-
dresses most of the practical considerations necessary to make a miti-
gation bank work by establishing policies and procedures which 
support the mitigation banking industry.92 The Federal Guidance 
specifically requires that developers act in accordance with sequenc-
ing by attempting to minimize, if not avoid, adverse impacts to wet-
lands before using a bank as compensatory mitigation.93 Additionally, 
the applicant must establish that on-site mitigation is not practicable 
or that the "use of a bank is environmentally preferable to on-site 
compensation. "94 
Although the CWA vests wetlands permit decision-making 
authority in the Corps, the Federal Guidance leaves approval of a 
proposed bank to a Mitigation Bank Review Team (MBRT), thereby 
diluting the Corps' powers.95 The MBRT comprises representatives 
from the Corps, EPA, FWS, National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS), and Natural Resources Conservation Service, as well as state 
and local representatives and resource agencies.96 The Federal Guid-
ance states that the MBRT should reach a consensus before a bank is 
approved, effectively giving each member veto power, while recogniz-
ing that consensus will not always be possible.97 After bank approval, 
the MBRT is not involved in its daily operations; the Corps creates all 
procedures regarding credit generation and withdrawals.98 
In general, the Federal Guidance precludes the use or sale of 
credits before the mitigation bank begins functioning.99 Despite ob-
jections from critics of mitigation banking who feared the continued 
loss of wetlands,lOo the Federal Guidance permits limited sale of cred-
approved a compensatory mitigation plan for the specific regnlated activity."). This provi-
sion appears to contradict the preamble to the N\VP issuance, which states that 
"[c]ompensatory mitigation will generally not be accepted in lieu of on-site avoidance and 
minimization." [d. at 38,654. 
92 See generally Federal Guidance, supra note 16; see also Liebesman & Plott, supra note 11, 
at 342. 
93 See Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,607. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at 58,610. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 58,610, 58,613. 
98 SeeFederal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,610. 
99 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 567. 
100 See Liebesman & Plott, supra note 11, at 343. 
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its in a bank's early stages,IOl This approach recognizes the vast 
financial outlay necessary for a mitigation bank, and provides poten-
tial bankers with a reasonable and predictable return on their invest-
ment,I02 Further, agencies still require a reasonable likelihood that 
the wetlands will be successfully restored or created before any credits 
may be issued. lo3 
The Federal Guidance specifies that a "bank sponsor is responsi-
ble for assuring the success of the debited restoration, creation, en-
hancement, and preservation activities at the mitigation bank .... "104 
Once incorporated in a federal permit, the EPA and the Corps may 
enforce this permit under the CWA's enforcement provisions.lo5 The 
Federal Guidance does not, however, specifY whether a bank sponsor 
is solely responsible, leaving open the possibility that a credit pur-
chaser could be vulnerable to an enforcement action upon failure of 
a mitigation bank.106 
II. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL COMPENSATORY MITIGATION 
Traditional compensatory mitigation under CWA sequencing has 
been largely unsuccessful from an ecological perspective because it 
fails to consider the negative consequences of on-site compensatory 
mitigationl07 such as fragmentation and isolation,108 and degradation 
and lack of oversight. I09 As a result, many mitigation efforts developed 
under CWA sequencing led to degraded and fragmented wetlands 
with, at best, minimal ecological value.1l0 
On-site mitigation, a type of compensatory mitigation, typically 
follows the destruction of wetlands through development.111 On this 
approach, a developer may destroy wetlands with a simple promise 
and plan to compensate the loss after the development's completion. 
101 See Federal Guidance. supra note 16, at 58,612. No early credits may be used unless: 1) • 
the MBRT has approved the bank and mitigation plan; 2) the bank sponsor has obtained 
the mitigation site; and 3) the banking instrument cont.,ins "appropriate financial assur-
ances." [d. These early credits will be subject to higher mitigation ratios. See id. 
102 See Liebesman & Plott, supra note II, at 343. 
103 See id. 
104 See Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,612. 
105 See CLEAN WATER ACT, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (identifying criminal, civil, and ad-
ministrative enforcement procedures and penalties). 
106 See Gardnel~ supra note 59, at 569. 
107 Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133. 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72. 
109 See infra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
no See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133; Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 80. 
III See Veltman , supra note 7, at 672-73. 
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If the compensatory mitigation project is not carried out, fails, or 
is subsequently degraded due to the previously discussed risks, a net 
loss of wetlands results.l12 According to a study conducted by the Flor-
ida Department of Environmental Regulation, thirty-four percent of 
permittees never commenced compensatory mitigation projects, and 
only six percent fully complied with all mitigation permit condi-
tions.113 
Additionally, most on-site compensatory mitigation projects yield 
widely scattered, small, and isolated or "patch" wetlands, which are 
not buffered by adjacent uses because they are created at an actual 
project site to compensate only for a particular project's wetland 
losses.114 For example, current regulations engendered numerous iso-
lated wetlands which provide no filtering function or flood control, 
and rarely provide even limited habitat value, created, say, in the mid-
dle of a parking lot or behind a grocery store or shopping center.ll5 
Such wetlands are essentially useless.ll6 Ultimately, patch wetlands 
probably will fail not only because of their location and size, but be-
cause their ecological potential is limited by their separation from 
broader wetlands ecosystems.117 
A lack of institutional oversight also explains, in part, the failure 
of traditional compensatory mitigation.118 A 1994 investigation by EPA 
and FWS reported that the success of mitigation projects depends on 
human factors (including the "commitment to plan, implement, 
monitor, adjust, and maintain mitigation") and economic factors (in-
cluding the level of financial commitment to a mitigation project) .119 
A traditional mitigation project lacks these factors because the Corps 
rarely enforces permit agreements.120 Thus, developers frequently 
have an extremely low level of commitment to the economic success 
of a mitigation project.121 
112 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 506; Veltman, supra note 7, at 673. 
113 See Sapp, supra note 10, at 116. The attempted mitigation projects studied had only 
a 27% success rate. See id. Two other Florida studies show even lower success rates. See id. 
114 SeeSokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 80,81; Veltman, supra note 7, at 673. 
115 See Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 79. 
116 See id. 
117 SeeSokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 79; Veltman, supra note 7, at 673. 
118 SeeSilverstein, supra note 3, at 133. 
119 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 541-42 (discussing U.S. EPA and U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Serv., Interagency Follow-Through Investigation of Compensatory Wetlands Mitigation 
Sites 1, 16 (May 1994) [hereinafter EPA & FWS Investigation]). 
120 See id. at 541, 542. 
121 See id. at 541-42. 
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Generally, the Corps grants approval to develop on existing wet-
lands if the developer demonstrates a plan to mitigate wetlands loss,122 
Often such developers do not complete or even initiate these plans.123 
Further, even projects that are initiated are not adequately monitored 
because of a lack of resources within the Corps,124 and a lack of com-
pliance mechanisms, such as a requirement that developers post a 
bond ensuring monitoring and maintenance for a specified time pe-
riod.125 
The developer's economic commitment corresponds to the wet-
land's success rate.126 Therefore, wetlands projects by developers seek-
ing to do the minimum amount of mitigation required by the Corps 
rarely succeed.127 Private developers lack the economic incentive to 
commit more than required by their permit to compensate for lost 
wetlands.128 The 1994 investigation by EPA and FWS identifies nu-
merous measures which might facilitate mitigation, such as hiring and 
retaining qualified environmental consultants, acquiring appropriate 
mitigation and buffer sites, and conducting any necessary corrective 
measures.129 A developer, however, seeking to do the minimum 
amount of mitigation required by the Corps probably will not take 
these measures even if financially able to do SO.l30 
Upon the failure of a mitigation project, developers are rarely 
held responsible, and there is often no pre-designated party to rectifY 
such failure.1 31 This also applies to successful projects, where degrada-
tion is possible because the developer is not required to monitor and 
maintain the project, and the Corps lacks the resources to do so.132 
Even if the Corps did have sufficient personnel to monitor privately-
122 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133; Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 80. 
123 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133. 
124 See id. Silverstein refe1'ences Leonard Shabman et ai., who called the process "paper 
mitigation." See id. at n.37; see also Veltman, supra note 7, at 676 (quoting Roy R. Lewis, III, 
prominent wetlands restorer, who argued that the mitigation noncompliance is due to a 
lack of a "wetland police," and to a lack of adequate funds and personnel pl'Opedy to 
monitor mitigation pl'Ojects). 
125 See Veltman , supra note 7, at 676. 
126 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 542 (discussing EPA & ru:s Investigation, supra note 
119, at 16). 
127 See Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 80-8l. 
128 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 542 (discussing EPA & Fw.S' Investigation, supra note 
119, at 16); Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 80-8l. 
129 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 542 (discussing EPA & ru:s Investigation, supra note 
119, at 16). 
130 See id.; Sokolove & Thompson, supra note 65, at 80-8l. 
131 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 133. 
132 See id. 
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created wetlands, however, the "present furor over private property 
rights makes it politically unpalatable."133 Thus, to a purely market-
minded developer, poor monitoring and enforcement of permit 
agreements provide an incentive not to initiate mitigation projects, or 
to allow initiated or completed projects to fail due to inadequate up-
keep.134 
The answer to recent wetlands protection failures may lie in miti-
gation banking, through which a developer may meet compensatory 
mitigation requirements without the associated problems. 
III. MITIGATION BANKING 
Mitigation banking is a subset of the third step in CWA sequenc-
ing, compensatory mitigation.135 Mitigation bankers earn mitigation 
"credits" for restoring, creating, or enhancing wetlands habitat (the 
mitigation "bank") ,136 Bankers may then use these credits to satisfY 
CWA requirements or sell them to developers,137 Currently, the major-
ity of mitigation banks are owned and operated by government enti-
ties,138 Mitigation banking differs from "project-by-project" mitigation, 
which compensates a specific activity and typically follows the permit-
ted loss of wetlands,139 Mitigation banking appeals to policy makers 
because it apparently provides a satisfactory alternative for both de-
velopers and environmentalists advocating "no net loss. "140 
133 Gardner, supra note 59, at 542. 
134 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 677. 
135 See id. at 658. 
136 See id. 
As defined by the Association of State Wetland Managers, mitigation bank 
usually refers "to a moderate size to large wetland restoration, creation, or 
enhancement project undertaken by a single developer (public or pdvate) or 
a consortium of developers to not only compensate for wetland impacts from 
a particular project but to act as a 'bank' with credits to compensate for fu-
ture wetland projects and impacts." Thus, credits are granted for mitigation 
efforts in advance of development, which can then be withdrawn as needed to 
compensate when development occurs. 
Id. at 658 (citing Jon Kusler, Mitigation Banks and Joint Projects: A National Perspective on Is-
sues, in MITIGATION BANKS AND JOINT PROJECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF WETLAND MANAGE-
MENT PLANS 1 (Association of State Wetland Managers, June 24-27,1992». 
137 See Sapp, supra note 10, at 108-09. 
138 See id. at 110; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 134. According to a 1993 Environmental 
Law Institute Report, 75% of all single-user banks are opel"ated by state departments of 
transportation, port authodties, or local governments. See Sapp, supra note 10, at 110. 
139 See Sapp, supra note 10, at 108. 
140 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 500. 
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A. Benefits of Mitigation Banking 
Mitigation banks consolidate resources and create an economy of 
scale, yielding more efficient wetlands protection.l4I Large-scale miti-
gation banks are more cost-efficient than smaller, site-specific mitiga-
tion efforts.l42 Additionally, bankers have both the resources and in-
centive to hire scientific consultants and implement technology to 
ensure the long-term success of a mitigated wetland. l43 Therefore, 
larger mitigation projects such as banks are likely to be cheaper and 
create higher quality wetlands than on-site compensatory mitigation 
by individual developers,144 
One of the major advantages of mitigation banking is that com-
pensatory mitigation is performed before, not after, wetlands destruc-
tion. l45 Where fragmentation and habitat scarcity already strain an 
aquatic ecosystem, it is safer to mitigate, attain functional equivalency, 
and then allow development,146 Since mitigation bankers generally 
may only sell credits after the permitting agency deems the bank suc-
cessful, wetlands will not be destroyed only to have the subsequent 
mitigation effort fail, resulting in a net IOSS.I47 Advance mitigation not 
only eliminates the "lag-time" between the destruction and reintro-
duction of wetlands, but actually creates a temporary wetlands surplus 
before the withdrawal of credits at the commencement of develop-
menLl48 
In addition, advance mitigation eliminates the typical compensa-
tory mitigation concerns of inadequate wetlands mitigation once de-
velopment has been completed,149 This is particularly important given 
the failure even to initiate traditional mitigation due to inadequate 
monitoring by the COrps,150 Moreover, traditional compensatory miti-
gation is not considered until the end of construction, and there is no 
141 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 559; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137; Sokolove & 
Thompson, supra note 65, at 81. 
142 See Gardnel', supra note 59, at 559; Silvel'stein, supra note 3, at 137; Sokolove & 
Thompson, supra note 65, at 82. 
143 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 558-59; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137; Sokolove & 
Thompson, supra note 65, at 81. 
144 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137. 
145 See id. at 135. 
146 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 506. 
147 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 558; Veltman, supra note 7, at 658, 678. 
148 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 558; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 135-36; Veltman, su-
pra note 7, at 658, 678. 
149 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 135. 
ISO See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
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guarantee that the developer will have enough money to carry out 
sufficient mitigation,151 In contrast, in a mitigation banking system, 
the developer can be required to purchase the credits before con-
struction begins, allowing the developer to budget accordingly,152 
Further, banking would enable the Corps to require even those 
projects currently considered too small to require traditional com-
pensatory mitigation, such as those authorized under the NWP, to buy 
a nominal amount of credits from a mitigation bank,153 The Corps 
could therefore require mitigation for all wetlands destruction and 
avoid the currently uncompensated, cumulative effects of small scale 
wetlands degradation,154 
Several benefits are associated with the type of consolidated, 
large-scale mitigation endeavors that are actualized through a mitiga-
tion banking system,155 Larger, off-site wetlands systems are more 
ecologically valuable than the isolated, on-site "patch" wetlands cre-
ated from individual mitigation efforts,156 The ecological benefits in-
clude: providing a habitat for a larger variety of wildlife; accommodat-
ing larger populations of the present species, which prevents 
inbreeding and promotes species stabilization; and allowing the wet-
lands to adapt to changes in the ecosystem,157 Further, on-site wet-
lands are often negatively affected by the impacts of construction and 
development itself, compromising the slight value that does exist in 
both the remaining natural wetlands and the mitigation wetlands at 
the development site,158 
Mitigation banking also provides a solution to the problem of 
monitoring isolated wetlands created by individual developers,159 The 
vast number of small, isolated wetlands currently permitted by tradi-
tional compensatory mitigation makes monitoring by the Corps im-
practicable,160 Consolidating these patch wetlands into a larger site 
151 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 678. 
152 See id. 
153 SeeSapp, supra note 10, at 113,115; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
154 SeeSapp, supra note 10, at 115; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137. 
155 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 136. 
156 See id.; Veltman, supra note 7, at 673. 
157 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 136; Veltman, supra note 7, at 673. 
158 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 136. 
159 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 560; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137; Veltman, supra 
note 7, at 658-59. 
160 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137. 
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enables the Corps more effectively to monitor mitigation projects 
while expending fewer resources.161 
The benefits of mitigation banking even extend to perhaps the 
largest category of critics of wetlands protection: landowners and de-
velopers.162 Because landowners and developers need not spend as 
much time and effort developing and implementing small-scale mitiga-
tion plans as they currently do, the mitigation banking system stream-
lines the wetlands regulatory system.163 Small landowners who lack the 
financial resources and expertise necessary for on-site mitigation can 
participate in a mitigation bank without the associated inconvenience 
and expense of traditional compensatory mitigation.164 The developer 
simply must purchase the appropriate amount of credits from an ap-
propriate mitigation bank.165 Further, developers benefit from the fore-
seeability and reduced cost such a system provides,166 
Finally, a mitigation bank relieves ill-equipped developers of the 
responsibility for long-term maintenance of the compensatory mitiga-
tion site, placing it instead in the hands of the experts managing the 
banks.167 The increased financial resources devoted to mitigation al-
low mitigation bankers to acquire the most promising sites and to use 
the appropriate technology to ensure the project's success,168 And, by 
providing extra credits for the successful restoration or creation of 
rare or complicated wetlands, mitigation bankers have an incentive to 
explore scientific innovations in the restoration and creation of wet-
lands.169 
Despite the broad appeal of mitigation banking, it is not univer-
sally accepted as a panacea for the problems with our regulatory sys-
tem, and many fear that it is too risky to warrant strong supportPO 
161 See id.; Veltman, supm note 7, at 658-59. 
162 See Silverstein, supmnote 3, at 138-39. 
163 See Sapp, supm note 10, at lI1; Silverstein, supm note 3, at 138-39; Veltman, supra 
note 7, at 658-59. 
164 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 508. 
165 See Sapp, supra note 10, at lII. 
166 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 138-39. 
167 See id. 
168 SeeSapp, supra note 10, at lI2. 
169 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 679. CUlTently, developers forced to mitigate on-site 
will opt for the easiest and least expensive option allowed by their permit. See id. 
170 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 519. 
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B. Problems with Mitigation Banking 
Many environmentalists worry that mitigation banking will accel-
erate wetlands 10ss,171 result in a net loss of wetlands area,172 allow 
mitigation sites too far from the original wetlands for which they are 
intended to compensate,173 and fail sufficiently to capture qualitative 
differences in wetland functions.174 
Wetlands present a unique problem to regulators because, unlike 
other regulated substances (e.g., Sulfur Oxides), they are highly dif-
ferentiated and their functional value is difficult to quantifY.175 There-
fore, even a market mechanism such as wetlands mitigation banking 
requires concurrent command and control regulations to ensure that 
the market achieves the appropriate level of wetlands protection.176 
In launching a mitigation bank, the banker must consider the 
ecological risk that a bank will not be as successful as required.!77 
Many bankers minimize this risk by restoring, creating, or enhancing 
wetlands designs that are easier and less expensive to construct and by 
hiring ecological specialists to enhance the quality of the wetland.17S 
Environmentalists, joined by FWS, fear that facilitating mitigation 
will accelerate wetlands destruction.179 In fact, mitigation banking has 
been called a "cheap trick," enabling original wetlands to be degraded 
in exchange for less valuable compensatory mitigation. ISO 
Opponents of mitigation banking also fear a resulting net loss of 
wetlands. lSI When mitigation credits are issued for restored, en-
harlCed, or previously-existing wetlands, a net loss in quantity or func-
tional quality results when those credits are used to compensate for 
wetlands destruction elsewhere.!s2 Further, environmentalists fear that 
171 See id. at 505. 
172 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at HI. 
173 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 508. 
174 See id. at 502. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 682. 
178 See id. at 682-83. 
179 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 505. The FWS observed that "making mitigation eas-
ier ... will accelerate the destruction of original wetlands and let them be replaced by 
artificial wetlands that do not have the normal balance of species." [d. 
ISO SeeSilvertein, supra note 3, at 140-41 (quoting Otis Wollan of the Placer County, CA 
Water Agency). 
181 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 14I. 
182 See id. The Federal Guidance expresses a preference for restoration projects because 
of their greater likelihood of success. See Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,608. Crea-
tion projects are authorized, but discouraged. See id. Simple preservation of existing wet-
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mitigation banking may create or exacerbate habitat fragmentation by 
allowing restoration sites too far from the biota they are intended to 
support.I83 This risk is minimized, however, because regulations sup-
porting or permitting wetlands mitigation banking include provisions 
specifying that developers may only purchase credits to compensate 
for wetlands impacts within a designated service area.184 In addition, a 
service area is determined for each bank upon its approval to assure 
that credits will not be used to compensate distant wetlands destruc-
tion.l85 
Finally, mitigation banking has not met with resounding success 
among potential bankers because of market and regulatory risks.l86 
The market for mitigation bank credits depends upon the demand 
for credits, which, in turn, depends upon governmental regulation 
mandating compensatory mitigation for unavoidable wetlands loss.l87 
Although the current administration supports mitigation bank-
ing,I88 most existing statutes and regulations do not specifically ad-
dress its use.l89 Adoption of the concept is usually mentioned only in 
guidance documents, which are subject to adoption, amendment, and 
revocation without any notice-and-comment period.l90 The existence 
of other compensatory mitigation options, conjoined with the ab-
sence of legislation compelling the use of mitigation banks, reduces 
the viability of mitigation banks.I9I 
EPA and the Corps have established guidelines on mitigation 
banking, furthering the mitigation banking effort by providing much-
needed regulatory support.192 This support may prompt the adoption 
lands may generate mitigation credits, but only in exceptional circumstances. See id. Fm"-
thermore, except in exceptional circumstances, preservation is only to be used in CO~UllC­
tion with other restoration, enhancement, or creation projects. See id. Presel"vation projects 
do offer some advantages, however, including permanent protection, removal from the set 
of potentially permitted destruction, and previously-achieved success. See Gardner, supra 
note 59, at 553. 
183 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 508. 
184 See, e.g., TEA-21, supra note 18, § 103 (b) (6) (M) (specifying that development must 
be within service area of mitigation bank in order to use mitigation credits to satisfy com-
pensatory mitigation requirements). 
185 See Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,611. 
186 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 682-83. 
187 See id. at 683. 
188 See id. 
189 SeeGardnel~ supra note 59, at 577; LeDesma. supra note 21, at 502. 
190 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 577. 
191 See id. at 578-79. 
192 See Federal Guidance, supra note 16. 
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oflegislation like TEA-21 , which explicitly mandates the use of mitiga-
tion banking wherever feasible. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR MITIGATION BANKING: TEA-21 
On May 22, 1998, Congress passed the Transportation Equity Act 
for the 21st Century (TEA-21),l93 With a $217 billion appropriation, 
TEA-21 is the largest public works measure ever authorized by Con-
gress,194 virtually guaranteeing that transportation will be this year's 
hottest market in the construction industry.195 The bill provides $175 
billion for highways and $42 million for mass transit programs 
through fiscal year 2003.196 This represents a forty-four percent in-
crease over the amounts provided by the 1991 Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) .197 
Under TEA-21, the Surface Transportation Program (STP) pro-
vides funds to states and localities for use on any federal-aid highway, 
including the National Highway System, bridge projects on public 
roads, transit capital projects, and public bus terminals and facili-
ties.198 In addition, TEA-21 expands the list of projects eligible for STP 
funds to encompass environmental provisions, including wetland and 
natural habitat mitigation,l99 Therefore, mitigation banks created to 
compensate for wetlands loss associated with highway construction 
can be classified as highway projects, making them eligible for federal 
funding. 2OO 
In a display of support for wetlands mitigation banking, a brief 
passage ofTEA-21 includes a provision stating that mitigation banking 
is the preferred method for replacing wetlands lost due to highway 
193 See TEA-21. supra note 18. 
194 See Howard Stusman & Tom Ichniowski, Tea Time iVloves to the Fast Lane, ENGINEER-
ING NEWS-REc.,July 27/ Aug. 3, 1998, at 87,87. 
195 See Forecast '99, supra note 19, at 50. The U.S. Department of Transportation and 
lawmakers report that of the $217 billion, an estimated $198 billion is guaranteed, and 
another $19 billion is possible if fuel-tax revenue is high enough and congressional appro-
priators agree to spend it. See Janice I. Dixon, TEA-21: Action Shifts to States, ENGINEERING 
NEWS-REc., Oct. 19, 1998, at 32. 
196 See Forecast '99, supra note 19, at 50. 
197 See id. 
198 See Stusman & Ichniowski, supra note 194, at 88. 
199 See id. 
200 See TEA-21, supra note 18, § 103(b) (6) (M). Congress first embraced wetlands miti-
gation banking in the Intenllodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 byauthor-
izing the use of fedel'al-aid highway funds to establish banks for use by state highway de-
partments. See Pub. L. No. 102-240, § 1006(d) (l3), 105 Stat. 1914, 1926 (1991) (replaced 
by TEA,-21. supra note 18). 
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projects.201 This is important because the federal and state highway 
agencies "are among the largest destroyers of wetlands."202 The Fed-
eral Highway Administration (FHWA) has submitted about 100 Envi-
ronmental Impact Statements each year, more than any other federal 
agency except the U.S. Forest Service.203 Highway agencies destroy 
significant amounts of wetlands "because their routes run through 
low, flat areas where natural wetlands once flourished. ''204 Congress' 
explicit preference of mitigation banking for compensatory mitiga-
tion projects by this large federal agency will promote mitigation 
banking. 
V. THE FUTURE OF MITIGATION BANKING: PAVING THE ROAD 
Mitigation banking may hold the key to an effective implementa-
tion of CWA's wetlands policy objectives, and therefore should be 
supported by explicit regulatory endorsement, as TEA-21 provides.205 
This bill's support may pave the road to a more effective wetlands 
mitigation banking system, both by creating a direct demand for miti-
gation bank credits within the federal highway industry, and by indi-
rectly indicating the regulatory commitment necessary to stimulate 
market support for tlle concept.206 Future regulations should likewise 
indicate support for mitigation banking,207 setting clear standards for 
authorizing the use of banks.20B In addition, a federal statute is neces-
201 See TEA-21, supra note 18, § 103(b) (6) (M). The Act states: 
With respect to participation in a natural habitat or wetland mitigation effort 
related to a project funded under this title that has an impact that occurs 
within the service area of a mitigation bank, preference shall be given, to the 
maximum extent practicable, to the use of the mitigation bank if the bank 
contains sufficient available credits to offset the impact and tlle bank is ap-
proved in accordance with the Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use 
and Operation of Mitigation Banks ... or other applicable Federal law (in-
cluding regulations) . 
ld. This provision supports mitigation banking not just for wetland loss, but also for natu-
ral habitat efforts. See id. 
202 See Can Agencies Pass Swampbuilding 101?, ENGINEERING NEWS-REc., Apr. 18, 1994, at 
16,16. 
203 See Foster J. Beach, III, TEA 21 Paves the Way fol' Fast" Envi1'Onmentai Reviews and Sin-
gle-Contractol' ProCUl'ements, ENGINEERING NEWS-REc., Oct. 19, 1998, at E-12. 
204 See Can Agencies Pass Swampbuilding 101?, ENGINEERING NEWS-REc., Apr. 18, 1994, at 
16,16. 
205 See infra text accompanying notes 206-15. 
206 See infra text accompanying notes 216-27. 
207 See infra text accompanying notes 228-34. 
208 See infra text accompanying notes 235-39. 
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sary to support, clarity, and set consistent standards for mitigation 
banking.209 In both specific regulations and a comprehensive federal 
statute, sequencing must be preserved, and mitigation banking must 
occur only after the exhaustion of avoidance and minimization.210 
A. Mitigation Banking Warrants Support 
Mitigation banking may provide the much needed flexibility to 
achieve the goal of "no net loss" both in theory and in practice. The 
only way to fulfill the goal of "no net loss" is to provide replacement 
ecosystems that function as well as the system that the developer is 
permitted to damage, and to do this before the damage occurs.211 
Mitigation banking preserves CWA sequencing while providing cost-
efficient, ecologically valuable, and well-monitored wetlands sys-
tems.212 Additionally, mitigation banking provides predictability to the 
current, often mysterious mitigation system, and allows developers to 
proceed with their projects knowing that they were involved in the 
development of acceptable mitigation prior to construction.213 
The fear that facilitating mitigation will accelerate wetlands de-
struction is understandable,214 given the Corps' pro-development 
stance.215 The maintenance of sequencing, however, assures that miti-
gation banking will only replace alternative forms of compensatory 
mitigation-which tend to occur on-site with a much lower success 
rate and ecological value-and will not lead to additional authoriza-
tion of wetlands destruction.216 Further, EPA and the Corps can more 
successfully monitor mitigation banks because they are fewer in num-
209 See infra text accompanying notes 240-50. 
210 See infra text accompanying notes 251-65. 
211 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 506 (citing Joy B. Zedler & Rene Langis, Comparisons 
of Constructed and Natural Salt iWarshes of San Diego Bay, RESTORATION AND MANAGEMENT 
NOTES, Summer 1991, at 21, 25). 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 140-60. 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 160-77. 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 178-79. 
215 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 141 (citing DAVID SALVESEN, WETLANDS: MITIGATING 
AND REGULATING DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS 33 (1990». Salvesen stated that the Corps has 
actually "led the nation in developing wetlands habitat." See id. at n.16. The anti-
environment attitude of the construction industry in general is also a cause for concern. 
See, e.g., Petel' Ruane, American Road & Transportation Builders Association, ENGINEER-
ING NEWS-REc. Executive Roundtable, Feb. 1, 1998, at C-14 (stating that "the environmental 
community's ~ihad,' 01' holy war, against [highway construction] is one of the biggest 
threats facing the transportation construction industry," and suggesting that "an aggressive 
counter-offensive" is necessal'y to respond to the "obstructionist activities" of "overzealous 
environmentalists") . 
216 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 686-87; see also supra text accompanying notes 140-60. 
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ber and larger in SIze than on-site compensatory mitigation proj-
ects.217 
Similarly, opponents of mitigation banking fear that issuing miti-
gation credits to allow the destruction of wetlands at the development 
site will entail a net loss of wetlands.218 These concerns, however, ap-
ply not only to mitigation banking, but to compensatory mitigation as 
a whole under the current system.219 Mitigation banking could allevi-
ate this problem by requiring functional equivalence between credits 
and the wetlands they are to compensate, and by requiring a higher 
ratio of acre to acre wetlands for certain projects.220 
The enactment of Federal Guidance has provided the initial sup-
port for mitigation banking necessary to spur the industry.221 Until 
recently, however, Congress has not explicitly expressed support for 
mitigation banking in other acts. The passage of the Transportation 
Equity Act for the 21st Century, however, contains a brief passage that 
could have a significant impact on the emerging field.222 
B. TEA-21 and Mitigation Banking Policy 
Market-based wetland mitigation banking has the greatest poten-
tial for fairly and effectively achieving the national goal of "no net 
loss. ''223 As with all market-based regulatory policies, federal regulators 
create and control the market for wetlands credits by the regulations 
they pass.224 Demand for mitigation banking credits is a function of 
the pressure to develop wetlands and the regulatory requirements of 
compensatory mitigation.225 Without regulations requiring mitigation 
for wetlands loss and degradation, developers would not need mitiga-
tion credits.226 Therefore, any regulatory policy that affects the 
amount or type of mitigation required in a given area necessarily af-
fects tlle market for mitigation credits and the feasibility of establish-
ing mitigation banks.227 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 180-83. 
219 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 141. 
220 See id. at 154, 157-58. 
221 See generally Liebesman & Plott, supra note 11, at 342. 
m See Kathleen Lundy Springuel, Wetlands Banking Gets a Boost, ENGINEERING NEWS-
REc., Oct. 19,1998, at E-ll. 
223 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 145-46. 
224 See id. at 146. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
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TEA-21 's explicit endorsement of mitigation banking may give 
mitigation banking the support it needs to succeed. A significant re-
striction on the operation of a successful mitigation bank system has 
been the high degree of market risk associated with it.228 TEA-21 pro-
vides regulatory support for mitigation banking by supplying a large 
potential purchaser of credits. This, therefore, reduces the risk of an 
insufficient demand for mitigation credits at certain times and in cer-
tain places.229 TEA-21 's governance of so many projects impacting wet-
lands could entice potential bankers with a market for their credits.23o 
TEA-21 provides certainty to the credit market and demonstrates fed-
eral commitment to mitigation banking.231 This support is essential 
for the development of a fully functioning system because bankers 
have little control over market risk.232 To further support the credit 
market, TEA-21 's explicit endorsement of mitigation banking should 
serve as a paradigm for future legislation. 
C. JEA-21 as a Model for Future Legislation 
TEA-21 should serve as a model for future legislation endorsing 
mitigation banking. Following TEA-21 's lead, future government 
regulations should clearly indicate that mitigation banks will continue 
to be endorsed.233 As seen in TEA-21 , regulatory support of mitigation 
banking should specifically indicate that such banking is only to be 
used when compensatory mitigation is required.234 This reduces con-
fusion in applying a statute supporting mitigation banking, which 
must also comply with the terms of the CWA, by explicitly recognizing 
the discretion of EPA and the Corps to determine when compensa-
tory mitigation is required under CWA sequencing.235 The agencies 
will continue to rely on the best professional judgement of its field 
personnel to make evaluations and determinations regarding mitiga-
228 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 682. 
229 See id. 
230 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 577-78 (discussing need for statutory affirmation of 
mitigation banking concept). By far, the most common type of mitigation bank is fOl" state 
Departments of Transportation (DOTs). See id. at 569 n.263. 
231 See generally, Gardner, supra note 59, at 578 (discussing uncertainty in absence of 
statutory support); Silverstein supra note 3, at 146 (discussing influence of regulatory pol-
icy 011 market demand for credits) . 
232 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 682-83. 
233 See id. at 683 (stating need for regulations supporting mitigation banking). 
234 See TEA-21, supra note 18, § 103(b) (6) (M). 
235 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 553. 
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tion.236 Further, this language provides the necessary flexibility for 
EPA and the Corps to create further requirements, such as a require-
ment that mitigation precede such projects. 
It is imperative that statutes like TEA-21, supporting the purchase 
of mitigation credits from a bank, specifY that the project must occur 
within the service area of a bank.237 This ensures that banks protect 
wetland values in the same watershed as the projects they are in-
tended to mitigate.238 
D. Clear Standards for the Creation of Mitigation Banks 
The success of mitigation banking depends on the development 
of firm regulatory policies, which establish and further ecological, 
economic, and administrative goals.239 Regulators must provide clear 
standards for authorizing banks, and for crediting and debiting wet-
lands, to assure bankers that the current support of wetlands mitiga-
tion banking is not likely to disappear.240 The current meager federal 
guidance does little more than endorse the mitigation banking prin-
ciple.241 As a result, approval of mitigation banks tends to be unpre-
dictable, adding to the uncertainty that has prevented mitigation 
banking from realizing its full potentia1.242 Moreover, the current 
mitigation banking system suffers from a lack of certainty because 
guidance documents can be adopted, amended, or revoked without 
any public notice-and-comment period.243 Besides specific regulatory 
standards, Congress should pass a comprehensive federal statute in 
support of mitigation banking, setting explicit standards for the crea-
tion and use of mitigation banks. 
236 See id. 
237 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 155. 
238 See id. 
239 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 682. 
240 See id. at 683. 
241 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 500. 
242 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 660. 
243 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 577. The federal guidance explicitly states: 
The policies set out in this document are not final agency action, but are 
intended solely as guidance. The guidance is not intended, nor can it be re-
lied upon, to create any rights enforceable by any party in litigation Witll the 
United States. The guidance does not establish or affect legal rights or obliga-
tions, establish a binding norm on any party and it is not finally determinative 
of the issues addressed. 
Federal Guidance, supra note 16, at 58,606. 
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E. A Federal Statute Is Necessary 
Although the federal government's policy statements encourage 
the use of mitigation banks in certain circumstances, explicit statutory 
support is necessary. A comprehensive federal statute is needed to 
support, clarity, and set consistent standards for mitigation banking.244 
Without a clear and comprehensive federal statute, the investment 
risk associated with establishing a mitigation bank is prohibitively 
high.245 Conversely, such a statute would reduce the investment risk by 
stabilizing the regulatory market.246 
Under the current system, states may supplement federal regula-
tions with more rigorous state regulations, tailored to address local 
concerns.247 This may result in a regulatory race to the bottom, how-
ever, because states are given the flexibility to relax their mitigation 
standards to compete for business development investment.248 Even in 
the absence of a race to the bottom, state standards can constrict the 
market for mitigation banking if state programs conflict with federal 
guidance due to different objectives.249 Federal standards are prefer-
able because they ensure at least a minimum degree of technical and 
administrative sufficiency, increasing the likelihood of mitigation 
banking's success.250 
In drafting a federal statute supporting mitigation banking, regu-
lators should carefully weigh all interests to determine the appropri-
ate balance of market efficiency and ecological preservation. A lack of 
specificity, such as that which exists under the present federal guid-
ance, increases market uncertainty and prevents the formulation of 
an effective mitigation banking system.251 On the other hand, more 
restrictive requirements in a federal statute will necessarily result in a 
premium on suitable sites and will reduce the amount of credits avail-
able to the market.252 
A federal statute setting standards for mitigation banking should 
not threaten the present preference for in-kind banking.253 By sug-
244 See, e.g., Gardner, sUfrra note 59, at 581; Veltman, supra note 7, at 684. 
245 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 685. 
246 See id. at 685. 
247 See id. at 681. 
248 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 500. 
249 See Veltman , supra note 7, at 681-82. 
250 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 500-01. 
251 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 156. 
252 See id. at 156. 
253 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 505. 
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gesting that banks be located near areas of expected future develop-
ment, regulators can help to ensure that wetlands values are not 
stripped from one watershed and replaced in another.254 
F. Preservation of CWA Sequencing 
The attempt to provide the needed flexibility in the regulatory 
scheme through a federal statute should not extend so far as to jeop-
ardize the CWA sequencing currently endorsed by both EPA and the 
Corps. Sequencing must be retained to preserve existing wetlands, so 
that valuable wetlands are not destroyed under relaxed permitting 
standards and mitigation crediting.255 Although the elimination of 
sequencing to support mitigation banking would increase the de-
mand for credits as the destruction of project-site wetlands is permit-
ted, it would not significantly increase predictability over a system 
where sequencing was uniformly required.256 Therefore, wetlands 
classification should supplement, not replace, sequencing in regulat-
ing wetlands mitigation and mitigation banking.257 
Critics of the present system denounce sequencing, claiming that 
it reduces the demand for permits and credits and discourages entry 
into the credit-supply market.258 Since the government is the only 
contracting party with an intrinsic interest in maintaining wetland 
functions, however, sequencing must be preserved.259 Otherwise, de-
velopers could destroy valuable wetlands that would have been 
avoided under sequencing, simply by buying mitigation credits to re-
place them.260 
Mitigation banking should only be employed as part of an ap-
proved compensatory mitigation plan in the third step of sequencing, 
when the use of a wetland is determined to be unavoidable.261 In that 
case, instead of offsetting the damage by creating a wetland of the 
same size in an unproductive location, the use of credits from a larger, 
more diverse and resource-oriented bank is preferable.262 
254 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 155. 
255 See Veltman, supra note 7, at 686. 
256 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 152. 
257 See id. at 146-47. 
258 See id. at 152. 
259 See id. at 146. 
260 See id. 
261 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 505; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 152; Veltman, supra 
note 7, at 686-87. 
262 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14, 153-56. 
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Many who favor mitigation banking urge that eliminating se-
quencing is necessary to create a predictable market for credits.263 
The maintenance and uniform application of sequencing, however, 
will also result in a predictable level of demand for mitigation credits 
by applicants whose projects require compensatory mitigation.264 
Thus, maintaining sequencing will not plague mitigation banking 
with unpredictability so long as it is consistently applied.265 
Mitigation banking fits within the current administrative inter-
pretations of sequencing. For example, preservation and uniform ap-
plication of sequencing in a mitigation banking system is beneficial in 
light of the current Nationwide Permit System (NWP), which admits 
of many exceptions.266 These exceptions engender numerous small, 
unmonitored wetlands created without the scientific knowledge and 
market incentive to ensure success.267 While such wetlands offer little 
ecological value, they cumulatively constitute a large wetlands habi-
tat.268 In all respects, it is better to require each applicant under the 
NWP system to purchase credits from a larger bank, which will endure 
for a longer period, and will be more valuable economically and ecol-
ogically and easier to monitor.269 
G. Public vs. Private Banks 
Both federal regulations supporting the use of mitigation banks 
and a federal statute regarding the establishment of mitigation bank-
ing should explicitly support private, as well as public, banks. 
While public sponsorship often provides the greatest control over 
how mitigation is conducted,270 private entrepreneurial banks offer 
benefits that public banks cannot. For example, private banks avoid 
conflict of interest concerns associated with public banks271 and are 
better able to take advantage of the economies of scale that make 
mitigation banking such a favorable policy.272 Private bankers have the 
263 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 152. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. at 152-53. 
266 SeeSapp, supra note 10, at 115; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
267 SeeSapp, supra note 10, at 115; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
268 See Sapp, supra note 10, at 113; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
269 See Sapp, supra note 10, at 113, 115; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137-38. 
270 See LeDesma, supra note 21, at 508-09. 
271 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 580. A regulatory agency that operates a mitigation 
bank could simultaneously compete with, and exert regulatory control over, privately op-
erated banks. See id. 
272 See Sapp, supra note 10, at 109-10; Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137. 
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financial incentive to hire the best available scientific experts to en-
sure the long-term viability of the wetland, since their profit is inextri-
cably linked to the success ofthe mitigation.273 
On the other hand, public agencies like Departments of Trans-
portation (DOTs) that create banks may not have the long-term re-
sources, staff, or expertise to carry out the requirements of establish-
ing and maintaining a bank.274 Mitigation banking requires that 
agency bankers be closely involved in the restoration or creation of 
compensation sites including land purchase, mitigation design, con-
struction, monitoring of replacement wetlands, and long-term main-
tenance.275 While agencies such as DOTs often have project funds 
available to pay for wetlands mitigation, they are limited in the long-
term availability of staff and/or funds for on-going maintenance and 
land ownership, making the purchase of credits from a private mitiga-
tion bank a preferable alternative.276 
Environmentalists fear that profit-minded bankers will cut costs 
during mitigation, thereby sacrificing the quality of the bank, in order 
to realize higher profits.277 They fear that this cost-cutting approach 
will not coincide with the goal of achieving high-quality, successful 
mitigation.278 This problem, however, inheres in any market-based 
system, and exists whether the bankers are profit-minded entrepre-
neurs or federal agencies working within a budget. Therefore, federal 
regulations, currently silent about the use of entrepreneurial banks 
for regulatory purposes, should explicitly encourage private, as well as 
public, mitigation banks.279 This will provide the necessary stability to 
encourage private investment.28o 
CONCLUSION 
Mitigation banking presents an innovative solution to many of 
the existing problems with current wetlands regulation. Explicit legis-
lative support, such as that contained in the recent Transportation 
273 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 137. 
274 See Evaluation of Presen'ation and Fee-Based Compensation as Methods fOl' De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) Compensatory Mitigation, in Environmental Research 
Needs in Transportation. 1997-2002 (last modified May 21, 1997) <http://itre.ncsu.edu/ 
itre/ cte/wetlands_trb.html>. 
275 See id. 
276 See id. 
277 See Silverstein, supra note 3, at 146. 
278 See id. 
279 See Gardner, supra note 59, at 577. 
280 See id. 
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Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), is essential to provide the 
necessary market support of mitigation banking. TEA-21 should serve 
as a model for future legislation, explicitly endorsing mitigation bank-
ing as the preferred alternative for compensatory mitigation. In addi-
tion, clear standards governing the establishment of mitigation banks 
and a comprehensive federal statute to support and clarity these stan-
dards would promote the establishment of an economically and envi-
ronmentally successful mitigation banking system. 
